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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MERLE HINDS COMP ANY, INC.
Plaintiff,

vs.

THR INDUSTRIAL COl\L\llSSION OF UTAH, UN IT ED
STATES FIDE LI TY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY,
PHILIP M. RALEIGH COMP 1tNY and HAROLD llA VVDEN,

Case No.
10891

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
APPEAL .FROl\I THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission
of the State of Utah for disability by reason of an
alleged accident arising out of or in the course of employment.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
The matter was heard by the Industrial Couunissiou and referred to a .l\ledical Panel. The Industrial
Commission made its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Award on February 16, 1967, which
Award was favorable to Applicant, Harold Bawden.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff Merle Hinds, Inc., seeks reversal of
the Industrial Commission's Award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Applicant Harold Bawden filed a claim with the
Industrial Commission on February 14, 1966, for a
disability allegedly due to alleged accident which is
said to have occurred on or about April 30, 1965. (R. 1).
Applicant subsequently underwent surgery at the
Latter-day Saints Hospital in Salt Lake City. Such
surgery was performed by Dr. Sam Taylor. Applicant
was initially confined between May 9, 1965 and May
15, 1965. (R. 113). Applicant was readmitted to the
hospital May 19, 1965 and was released July 20, 191.i5.
(R. 112).
Harold Bawden has made conflicting statements
regarding the origin of the injury on which he bases
his claim. Applicant, during the hearing before the
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Industrial Commission, stated that he had no injury
prior to April 30, 1965 and that on that date he experienced a warm sensation in his right knee while stoopiug
to read a label. (R. 30). However, on at least three
other occasions, Applicant stated that he had injured
his knee at home (R. 149, 116 and 117).
Applicant was hired as a commissiou salesman
(R. 28 and 29) who solicited orders on his own initiatiYe
and at his own discretion. He used his own automobile
for which he was not compensated. (R. 29). He was,
at the time of the alleged accident, performing actiYities uuusual to his job. (R. 31, 167). He did not come
in rnntact with anyone or anything, nor was he lifting
any object or objects. ( R. 30, 31). Applicant following
the alleged accident, delivered some of the orders but
has not otherwise returned to work for the Plaintiff
:\Ierle Hinds, Inc., since the alleged accident. (R. 32).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY FAILED
TO MAKE CRRTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT
AS HEQUIRED BY LA \V.
Section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires:
"After each formal hearing, it shall be the
duty of the commission to make findings of fact
auci co11clusio11s of law ... "

3

Plaintiff Merle Hinds, Inc., placed squarely before
the Industrial Commission the issue of whether an
"accident", as defined by the workmen's compensation
laws of the State of Utah, had in fad occurred, by the
following language at page 45:
".1\Ir. Mock: And do you also have before you
the question as to whether an accident did or
did not occur?
The Referee: This is the issue that will be resolved bv the Commission. But the Panel will
be instr~cted to assume that some type of an
event or accident occurred. Thev don't decide.
They assume. And they relate ~ny subsequent
medical causation to that, or lack of medical
causation."
And again at page 100:
"Mr. Mock: Is there a preliminary hearing
regarding whether or not there was an accident?
The Referee: No, there will not be. But the
issue of the coverage will have to be resoh-ed at
the time of the final Order of the Commission."
The Industrial Commission recognized that the
primary issue was whether or not an "accident" occurred
and, if so, whether such accident was in the course
of the Applicant's employment. (R. 167). However,
in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Award, the Commission glossed over the two parts of
this prime issue in utter disregard of the followi11g
facts:
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I. That applicant was a comm1ss1on salesman

who was not subject to Plaintiff Merle
Hinds, lnc.'s control as defined by section
35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated (1953). (R.
10, 11, and 30). Therefore, Applicant was an
independent contractor.

2. That applicant was engaged in an activity

unusual to him and not part of his duty as a
salesman. (R. 167, 43).

3. That no definable "accident" in fact occurred.
(R. 179).
As to Fact No. 1, above, the terms of employment
and the means of compensation are almost identical to
the facts of Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commis~ion, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, 1028, where this Court
stated:
"There was no written contract ... Knudsen
was supposed to sell plaintiff's products ... He
was not specifically limited as to territory ... He
received no instructions as to where he should
go, and when he should go, or how he should
conduct his work. He furnished his own means
of transportation, paid all his own expenses,
and used his own judgment concerning what
trips he should make and when he should make
them. Mr. Stover, of the plaintiff company, testified that he had no right to control deceased's
moyements or manner of doing his work-and
that he did not in fact do so."
As to Fact No. 2, above, the Commission found
(page 167, the official record):
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( T) he Hearing Examiner finds that tlu,
Applicant, on the date in question, was engaged
in activities unusual to him; i.e., assisting iu
getting out an order. In so doing it required that
he crouch low on his haunches in order to examine a low stocked row of merchandise."
The Applicant was neither required to perform this
function nor was he requested to do so. He voluntarily
returned after loading his vehicle to the stock room
to pick up some additional stock to fill an order of which
he alone had knowledge. ( R. 30). He was not in the
"course of his employment."
As to Fact No. 3, above, the word "accident" a-;
used in section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated ( l95B),
should haYe its orclinar~- meaning. This Court in Pintar
v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d
414, 415 (1963), stated:
" . . . It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensation that his disability be shown to result
... from an identifiable accident or accidents in
the course of the e~n ployrnent." (Emphasis added).
In a 1964 determination of the Industrial Commission under identical facts ( R. 177), with the exception
that the Plaintiff l\Ierle Hinds, Inc., did not, at the
time of the alleged "accident'', carry any workmen's
compensation coYerage, the Commission found that
there was no "definable accident."
The Industrial Commission has not, contrary to
the statutory charge, determined the real issne of
6

ll'hclher all "accident", meaning a definable accident in
the course of employment covered by the \Vorkmen's
Compensation Act, in fact occurred. Instead the Commission has taken the Medical Panel's findings and
incorporated them into the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Award, contrary to the Commission's
own admissions. At page 4.5 of the official record, immediatel~r preceding and following the quoted material
011 page 4 of this brief, states:
''Mr. Mock: May I ask for a point of informotion regarding procedures at this time?
'Vhether the connection of these injuries, and
the various treatments that are shown on the
records, is a matter for the Medical Board to
consider?
The Referee: I think so. I think the problem
we have here is establishing the time and the
onset of some occurrence, which has been narrowed to the 30th of April. And the subsequent
events would be evaluated by the Medical Panel,
which the Commission will appoint.

* * *

l\Ir. Mock: The medics have no prerogative
to decide whether or not there was an accident.
The Referee: They are specifically instructed
that they do not have that prerogative."

And again at page lfi8 of the record it states:
"The Hearing Examiner, in adopting the
Medical Panel Report and its findings, therein
finds: ... "
The Medical Panel then assumes, but without any
basis for so assuming, what the Commission had in-
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structed the Medical Panel to assume. ( R. 15G). Th('
"adoption" of the findings of the Medical Panel Report
is arbitrary, capricious and directly contrary to thl'
responsibilities of the Commission. The information
and evidence elicited from the Commission at the time
of the hearing also clearly stated this responsibility.
(R. 45, 60 and 168).
.
This "adoption'' of the Medical Panel Report
assnmes that an "accident" occurred. By the record i11
this case, the .Medical Panel was instructed to ass11111c
an "accident" had in fact occurred. ( R. 165). The
"adoption" therefore shifts to the Medical Panel, h.1
way of instruction, the burden and responsibility to
actually determine by assumption the facts and co11clusions of law which are the responsibility of the Commission under section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated
(1953).

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED
A DIFFERENT STANDARD TO A "N'ONCOVERAGE" CASE.
The Industrial Commission in the case entitled
Dal ilfar TV. Davis v. KUTV, Inc., and The Stutc
Insurance Fund, claim no. 6147 (R. 177) held that the
Applicant therein did not have an "accident" since
"Applicant lifted no weight. He did not slip or fall. The
8

cable incident required no unusual exertion." In that
case the Applicant stooped down in a squatting position
to either plug in or disengage an electrical plug from
a socket. The Commission concluded by stating: "The
Commission finds that the claimed injury did not arise
out of or in the course of his employment because he
did not have a definable accident." (R. 177).
The facts in the present case are identical to that
of the KUTV case except herein Merle Hinds, Inc.,
<lid not, contrary to its belief (R. 80), have workmen's
compensation coverage at the time of the alleged accident. The statute requires that the same standard
must be applied to non-coverage cases. Section 35-1-57,
Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides for certain
penalties . for non-coverage cases. However, they are
not applicable in this instance since Applicant elected
to proceed against Plaintiff under section 35-1-58
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) wherein it states:
"Any employee ... may ... file his application with the commission for compensation in
accordance with the terms of this title, and the
commission shall hear and determine such application as in other cases .. . ,, (Emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission failed to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to its statutory
charge. The Commission improperly delegated this
authority and duty to an instructed Medical Panel.
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'fhe instructions to the Medical Panel required the
assumption of an "accident" in course of employmeut.
The Commission never made any findings on such basic
issue. An Award, without such findings, is clear and
conclusive evidence of arbitrary and capricious action.
Even had the Commission made such findings, it would
have been applying a '"double standard", contrary to
statutory law, and inconsistent with other actions by
the Commission on identical issues.
It is respectfully submitted that the Award of tlic
Industrial Commission heretofore entered in this case
should be reversed and set aside.

Respectfully submitted,
NESLEN AND MOCK
H. Byron Mock and
James R. Brown
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Merle Hinds, Inc.
1000 Continental Bank Bl<lg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
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